

WATCH LIST OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-CP TACTICS

1. Evidence of imposition of closer organizational controls over non-satellite CP's:

- a) increased travel of CP leaders to the USSR;
- b) presence of Soviet "advisers" to the CP;
- c) purges of national leaders; particularly, of "fire-brands," resistance and Spanish Civil War veterans;
- d) promotion of functionaries engaged in "mass Work" and parliamentary action;
- e) changes in Party tactics; extensive "self criticism" and "criticism" of policy and individuals;
- f) organizational changes and changes in Statutes, particularly changes in the definition of the nature of the Party, the character of its membership and duties of members.
- g) intensified training program and the use of training materials produced in the USSR;
- h) sending of Communists to Soviet Schools;

2. Evidence of increased financial assistance:

- a) more and better propaganda materials;
- b) more elaborate "peace affairs";
- c) more financial assistance to Communist trade unions and to strikers;
- d) more elaborate campaigning during elections.

3. Further implementation of the "Softening up" effort:

- a) offers by the USSR or Satellites of attractive trade arrangements;
- b) soft-pedaling of attacks on lower-ranking, left-wing, anti-Communist labor leaders, members of Parliament; and on non-Communist organizations;
- c) intensified agitation about the "fascist" measures of the Government; and about American military "occupation" of the country;
- d) strong-arm attacks on American servicemen; or other American personnel;
- e) proposals for common action with Socialist organizations;
- f) support of non-Communist candidates in civil and trade union elections;
- g) creation of new front organizations;
- h) new publications, particularly, disguised publications;
- i) dissemination of deception materials, particularly in the yellow press: discovery of secret local "deals" on the part of anti-Communist leaders and virulent, slanderous attacks on them; reports of "secret" negotiations with USSR.
- j) deals with right-wing groups and individuals;

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- k) intensified attempts to penetrate state security services: increased "peace," united-front, and deception propaganda tailored to members of the police;
- l) intensified attempts to subvert the defense services;
- m) attempts to recruit key personnel in Government and non-Communist parties under "peace", "democracy" slogans;
- n) fake purges of individuals and their penetration of other groups;
- o) activation of "sleepers" in non-Communist institutions, particularly of "ex" Communists now in Social Democratic Parties, religious organizations;
- p) intensified work among youth: creation of new youth fronts;
- q) intensified agitation in the trade unions against US "war plans," the "fascist government," and for "peace;"
- r) factionalism within the Party leadership as a result of the increased Soviet pressure on the Party and of disagreement with the united-front tactic;
- s) the effect of the tactics on key leaders of Society should be watched to see who are wavering, and those who defect to the CP program should be very carefully observed;
- t) attempts to intensify economic warfare: creation of new disguised business firms; increasing economic espionage; increasing illegal East-West trade.

4. Evidence of substantial change in the role of the CPSU and its relations to the Soviet State:

- a) indications that basic decisions are still being made by Party organs or are increasingly being made by State organs;
- b) indications that middle and lower Party organs are exercising increased or lessened authority over corresponding State agencies;
- c) indications that "check-up" and "verification" agents are working closely with local Party organs, or are by-passing them and are reporting to higher Party organs; or that they are operating more directly under the supervision of State organs;
- d) changes in the functions, powers, and organization of departments of the Central Committee apparatus;
- e) similar indications in Satellite Party-State relationships.

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APPENDIX A

FOREIGN CP'S

1. More than 120 representatives of foreign CP's attended the Congress. Representatives of the CP's Brazil and Indonesia were not identified by name. More than two-thirds of the foreigners represented non-satellite Parties. Of these, about 30 delivered short speeches. This was the first time, to our knowledge, that foreign Communists publicly took part in a Congress of the CPSU.

2. The speeches of the non-satellite foreign representatives uniformly included reaffirmation of the pledge of their Parties never to fight against the Soviet Union, and indulged in the worship of Stalin and Russia.

3. It is interesting to note that almost 20% of the foreigners are known to have played a part in the Comintern. The majority of these represented non-satellite CP's at the Congress.

4. Over 40 countries were represented at the Congress. On the basis of delegates publicly identified, the only significant omissions were the following. Some of these countries may have been represented by the "and others" identification made during the Congress:

United States  
Cuba  
Guatemala  
Bolivia  
Colombia  
Ecuador  
Peru  
Portugal  
Union of South Africa  
Indo-China  
Thailand  
Malaya  
Philippines  
Japan  
New Zealand

The absence of publicly identified representatives from Southeast Asia, except Burma and Indonesia, is in accord with the relative lack of attention paid to these countries during the Congress proceedings.

5. Most of the Latin American and Western European delegations numbered 1 - 3 persons, Mexico however, sent 4 people. The largest of the non-satellite delegations, as could be expected, were those of France and Italy, with 6 representatives each. The size of the Middle Eastern delegations was surprisingly large (Iran - 5; Israel - 4; Syria - Lebanon - 6). Also worth noting is the fact that the Icelandic Party, with about 1300 members, had 3 delegates present.

6. The size of the European Satellite delegations was about 3 apiece. Bulgaria had 5, however, and East Zone Germany, 7. In the Far East, China was represented by 6 delegates, and Korea, by 7.

7. The most significant statements about the role and the prospects of the non-satellite foreign CP's were made by Stalin, in his speech to the Congress of 14 October.

He recognized the importance of the foreign CP's (in the mutual "struggle for peace" and in the "struggle for liberation") to the Soviet Union. He referred specifically to the strikes in England in 1918-19 against British military intervention in Russia.

The CPSU must, and is, helping the "fraternal parties," he said.

The "Communist, democratic, workers' or peasants' parties which have not yet come to power and which continue to work under the heel of Draconic bourgeois laws deserve special attention," he said. They will "emerge victorious." They have to their advantage three factors which the Bolsheviks did not have:

- (1) repressive measures against them are not quite so bad as were Tsarist measures against the Bolsheviks;
- (2) They have the example and the practical lessons of the CPSU and the satellite CP's to guide them;
- (3) The bourgeoisie has become more reactionary and can no longer compete with the Communists for the support of the "people."

He made use of his recent "discovery" of the "basic law of capitalism" that it is based on "exploitation" to produce "maximum profits" to explain how the character of the bourgeoisie had changed. "The banner of bourgeois democratic rights has been thrown overboard," he went on, and it is up to the Communists to "raise" it up again and carry it forward in order to command maximum popular support.

Stalin's remarks and his article in Bolshevik amount to an endorsement of the use by the West European CP's of the united front tactic. The aim of this tactic is to arouse opposition to Western security measures, to cause friction between Western European countries and the U.S., and to weaken the political stability of West European governments through fear of war; confusion about the intentions of the U.S., the USSR, the Communists, and the European bourgeoisie. Police measures taken against the Communists (and provoked by them) will be seized upon as "proof" that European regimes have become "fascist." Confusion over Party intentions will result from Communist adoption of traditional democratic liberties. Stalin's reference to the aid which the CPSU will give to the "fraternal parties" will, in our opinion, be implemented in practical terms (such as increased financial assistance, more propaganda materials, the posting of Soviet advisors and technicians to non-orbit CP's); and probable, by closer organizational control over the Parties.

Additional evidence circumstantially supporting the theory that closer control is in the offing are these: (1) the presence of the "fraternal" representatives at the Congress; (2) their participation in the Congress; (3) Stalin's article in Bolshevik, published just before the Congress, in which he expresses a certain dissatisfaction with the "level of Marxist development of the majority of the Communist Party in foreign countries;" (4) the recent purges in France.

8. The relative lack of attention paid to the Communists in Southeast Asia and the absence of representatives from many countries there during the Congress may indicate satisfaction with the way the "struggle for liberation" is going. They may also indicate Soviet recognition of Chinese responsibility for SEA. Malenkov, in his speech at the opening session of the Congress, referred to the "ever more determined resistance to the imperialist enslavers" and the "expanding scale of the national-liberation movement." No new aspects are discernable in these remarks. Insurrectionary attempts in SEA will probably continue as before; and efforts will continue to be exerted to foment trouble in the other "colonial and dependent countries (Egypt, Iran, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, etc.)"

9. The "Peace" Movement. Stalin's Bolshevik article reflected on the character of the "Peace" Movement. Its immediate objective remains that of impeding Western security and of generating hostility to the U.S. He explicitly acknowledged the revolutionary potential of the movement, however, "in a certain concatenation of circumstances." His rather bald statement is, we believe, the first time that this potential has been publicly acknowledged.

10. Cominform. It is of interest to note that the Cominform was not mentioned in the published speeches. This tends to support recent rumors to the effect that the Cominform is going to be allowed to quietly disband.

11. Attached is the list of foreign delegates to the Congress.